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The Right to Religious Freedom—A Theological
Comment
Hille Haker, PhD
Religious freedom is too important a right to be politicized. Religions have
an important role to play in the public sphere and are an indispensable voice
in ethical conflicts of different kinds. Therefore, religions are necessarily
political. But this does not mean that they should follow a political theology
which claims that only those laws are valid that concord with the natural
and, ultimately, divine law. I analyze the theological context of the religious
freedom debate in the twentieth century, adding a theological-ethical
analysis to the legal interpretations. I argue that the moral principle of
dignity and the right to freedom is not only a legal right that creates
privileges but a moral right that comes with responsibilities. Theologically
speaking, the legally granted right to religious freedom must be interpreted
in view of one’s religious tradition, and Christianity, among several other
religions, prioritizes those who are most discriminated against and morally
injured in their societies. Christian ethics entails the responsibility to respect
and protect the needs and rights of others. Its morality is not rooted in an
objective order but in the gift of human freedom, which calls moral agents
to respect the moral freedom and moral agency of others as one’s own moral
freedom.

 Hille Haker, PhD, has held the Richard McCormick, SJ Endowed Chair of Catholic Moral
Theology at Loyola University Chicago since 2010, after teaching at Frankfurt University,
Germany and Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Mass. Her research focuses on questions of
moral identity and narrative ethics, social ethics, bioethics, and feminist ethics. She served on
several Bioethics Committees, including the European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies to the European Commission, and on the Board of Editors for the Journal Concilium.
Books include Moralische Identität: Literarische Lebensgeschichten als Medium ethischer
Reflexion (1999), Ethik der genetischen Frühdiagnostik (2002), and Hauptsache gesund (2011). A
collection of essays: A Critical Political Ethics—A Revision of Catholic Social Ethics is
forthcoming 2019. She coedited several books in the field of bioethics, and most recently
Unaccompanied Migrant Children: Social, Legal, and Ethical Perspectives (2018, with Molly
Greening). Related journal issues for Concilium that she coedited include Natural Law—A
Controversy (2010), HIV/AIDS (2007), and The Structural Betrayal of Trust: Sexual Abuse in the
Catholic Church (2004). Her present research is a book project entitled Recognition and
Responsibility—A Foundation of Christian Ethics.
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INTRODUCTION
Every time I cross the border to the United States, I thank God I am a
legal immigrant, white, and a citizen of the European Union and
Germany, coming from a country and entering another where I expect my
rights to be protected. The laws of the land may in part differ from the
European ones, and even clash with some of my religious values and
convictions. But since morality and positive laws never entirely coincide,
the laws of a nation-state challenge me to reevaluate my convictions as
much as I will challenge the rightness of some of the United States’ laws.1
Our identities entail multiple facets, mediated by the many social,
cultural, religious, and political contexts that shape our lives. Everyone
must navigate multiple identities in contexts of plural values and norms.2
At the turn of the century, philosophical and theological ethicists,
together with political and social theorists, debated social and cultural
transformations spurred by globalization and new transnational economic
and cultural constellations, new technologies, the deregulation of the
economic sector, and international treaties that shape international
cooperation.3 But international terrorism motivated new forms of war a
few years into the new millennium, the collapse of the financial markets
caused a global economic crisis, and the recent rise of populism resulted
1. For example, the abolition of and stance against the death penalty is a precondition for
membership in the European Union and regarded as a centerpiece of European values. See, e.g.,
EU Strongly and Unequivocally Opposes Death Penalty, EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERV.
(Oct. 10, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/
33622/eu-strongly-and-unequivocally-opposes-death-penalty_en.
2. See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005).
3. See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 250–377 (1995) (discussing the debate over
social, polititcal, and legal changes arising from increasing globalization).
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in a radically changed international political landscape. The wave of
nationalism in Europe, Asia, and the United States has pushed
transnational problems such as global hunger, global poverty, global
migration, and climate change to the background; instead, more and more
countries debate their national and cultural identity. 4 While my most
fundamental religious conviction may be captured in Pope Francis’s call
to “care for our common home,”5 this is not how the religious freedom
debate is currently being shaped in the United States. In the following, I
will contextualize the current religious freedom debate in three steps:
first, I will explain the return of religion in the public sphere;6 second, I
will attend to the historical context of the religious freedom debate;7 and
third, I will address the politicization of religion, which includes my
comments on Leslie Griffin’s analyses of the current lawsuits in the
United States.8
I. RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
In modern societies, which are, by definition, pluralistic with respect
to moral values and religions, any religion is granted religious freedom
or liberty. In the public sphere, however, religious individuals or
institutions must accept that they act as one voice among others, which
raises the question of lived religions in societies that are shaped by the
pluralism of values and forms of life. Some Christian groups in the United
States, however, see their moral convictions under threat by a society that
has moved in another direction than the proclaimed Christian ethics.
Catholic bishops, following the papal teachings of John Paul II, which
were widely rejected by many Catholic ethicists as a step behind the
Vatican II Council,9 refer to the authority of the Magisterium of the
Catholic Church in moral questions. Furthermore, they hold that divine

4. This is most evident in the European Union but also, for example, in India. See generally
Akeel Bilgrami, Reflections on Three Populisms, 44 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 453 (2018)
(discussing the rise of populism in the United States, Great Britain, and India). For an international
analysis of this recent transnational debate, see generally POPULISM IN EUROPE AND THE
AMERICAS: THREAT OR CORRECTIVE FOR DEMOCRACY? (Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira
Kaltwasser eds., 2012).
5. See generally Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, On Care for Our Common Home (May 24, 2015),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_
enciclica-laudato-si.html [hereinafter Laudato Si’].
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III; see generally Leslie C. Griffin, Religious Freedom, Human Rights, and
Peaceful Coexistence, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 77 (2018).
9. See generally Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (Aug. 6, 1993),
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_
veritatis-splendor_ge.html.
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truth is the ultimate authority that must guide any political order. 10 It
echoes an understanding of theology that underlies the “political
theology,” first coined in the legal writings of Carl Schmitt, who used
theology as a metaphor for the quasi-theological legitimization of the
secular state.11 For Schmitt, the reference to the divine foundation of
morality was a metaphor for an (unaccounted) normative authority of the
state, pointing beyond the positive law.12 Today, in contrast, a
political-theological movement has reemerged within Christian groups
who, at the same time, hold powerful positions in the government and/or
courts: they strive to reinterpret the way that the separation of church and
state is spelled out. The current court cases reveal the tensions that have
always existed in this arrangement but today reemerge under the banner
of religious freedom. Thus, the right to religious freedom may be
interpreted either as one right among other rights, determining how
religious and nonreligious groups are to navigate the different facets of
their identities in the civil sphere, or as the primary right that comes with
the moral authority to reject the legitimacy of certain laws for vast
numbers of citizens, religious and nonreligious alike.
A. Religion in the Civil Sphere
Religion, we have learned from the discourse of “religion in the public
sphere” of the last decades, is never merely a private affair.13 But
whatever religion’s role in the public may be, we need to be aware that
the public discourses are dominated by those who have access to media
and controlled by those who are visible and audible due to their financial,
political, or social power. In this situation, the question is how civil
societies can take on the political-ethical task of social integration. In a
surprising acknowledgment of religion’s role in the public sphere,
philosopher and social theorist Jürgen Habermas has raised this question
since the early 2000s.14 He takes religions’ critique of political liberalism
seriously, namely that religions have been pushed too much into the
private sphere, denying them their rightful public voice in the civil public
10. See infra Part II.
11. See generally CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT
OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., MIT Press, 1985) (1922).
12. See id. at 36–52 (discussing divine morality and its connection to vast monarchical and
executive power).
13. See generally JUDITH BUTLER ET AL., THE POWER OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
(Eduardo Mendieta & Jonathan VanAntwerpen eds., 2011).
14. See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION: PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS 114–47 (Ciaran Cronin trans., Polity Press 2008) [hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN
NATURALISM AND RELIGION]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS ET AL., AN AWARENESS OF WHAT IS MISSING:
FAITH AND REASON IN A POST-SECULAR AGE 15–23 (Ciaran Cronin trans., Polity Press 2010)
[hereinafter HABERMAS, AN AWARENESS OF WHAT IS MISSING].
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sphere. While Habermas is mostly interested in establishing a
counter-force to the unaccounted for functional systems such as the
financial markets, a new scientific “naturalism,” and private systems that
may well increase social disintegration,15 his turn to religion offers one
possible account for the public role of religions. Regarding the formation
of new ideas of social integration that must be transnational rather than
national, he renders religious voices not only acceptable in the public
sphere but indispensable; they may provide the sources to keep alive
questions which otherwise may be buried under the weight of
instrumental reason.16 This means: rather than regarding religion’s
assumed idiosyncratic rationality as a threat to a democratic state,
Habermas argues that the public voice of Christianity is especially needed
today, because Christianity claims a specific “awareness of what is
missing.”17 Explicitly taking up the New Political Theology of Johann
Baptist Metz, Habermas agrees that theology may remind society of what
may be lost “in the face of growing and disarming systemic strains on the
social integration of our political communities.”18
And indeed, in his New Political Theology, deliberately juxtaposed to
Carl Schmitt’s political theology, Metz insisted on the connection
between Christian theology and political ethics.19 Theology, he argued,
must resist the refusal to attend to suffering, and remember the duty to
stand in solidarity with those who suffer or, put differently, with those
who are the victims of a social order that throws them into oblivion.20
Religious freedom, turned positively, would then mean—at least in the
case of the Christian religion—spelling out the practical and political
responsibility, addressing anybody whose dignity and rights are violated.
In contrast to this understanding of the public role and political ethics of
theology, what we observe in the current debate on Christianity’s
freedom of religion is an identity politics pursued by Christian groups,
aimed at defending a privileged status of one particular religion.
In the civil sphere of public life, however, the reality of lived religions
and nonreligious life forms requires tolerance as much as mutual respect
among people who all share (or should share) the foundational value of
15. See generally HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION, supra note 14.
16. HABERMAS, AN AWARENESS OF WHAT IS MISSING, supra note 14, at 15–23.
17. See Jürgen Habermas, “The Political”: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable
Inheritance of Political Theology, in THE POWER OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note
13, at 15–28 (discussing the legitimizing effect of religious discourse on political actions).
18. Id. at 23.
19. JOHANN BAPTIST METZ, ZUM BEGRIFF DER NEUEN POLITISCHEN THEOLOGIE 1967–1997
(1997) [hereinafter METZ, NEUE POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE]; see also JOHANN BAPTIST METZ,
FAITH IN HISTORY AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A PRACTICAL FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY (J. Matthew
Ashley trans., 2007) [hereinafter METZ, FAITH IN HISTORY].
20. METZ, NEUE POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE, supra note 19.
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human dignity.21 Tolerance is a core value of modern societies.
Paradoxically, it is not “permissive” in one crucial respect: it does not
allow the toleration of disrespect for the human rights of others. Moral
conflicts, we know, normally arise in the interpretation: what exactly
counts as a human rights violation is not always easy to discern. It
requires the willingness to listen to all sides and the willingness to come
up with prudent practical solutions. Public debates often reveal that the
claim of rights turns out to be more complex at second sight. As recent
court cases have shown, religious groups may consider their values and
identities under attack by increasingly secular societies, by states that
favor one religion over another, or by legal decisions that they claim
infringe upon their right to religious freedom.22 But others, too, see their
values and identities under attack; they do not accept that the religious
freedom right as such trumps the rights of others, or any other right. In
the civil sphere, it is therefore crucial to frame the moral conflicts in such
a way that those whose practices (or identities) are questioned are not
disrespected for the way they live, what they believe, or for the dissent
within their own religion. One could call this a second-order respect and
tolerance principle, which applies, too, to the right to religious freedom.
Once practiced, legal resolutions may be the exception rather than the
rule. When conflicts cannot be resolved informally, however, courts must
sometimes judge the scope and limits of religious expressions and
practices protected under religious freedom. In the cases Leslie Griffin
has presented, courts must also sometimes decide whether religious rights
can in fact be violated indirectly by the freedom of others, or even by the
laws of the land.23
France often serves as an example of how conflictual the civil sphere
21. See infra Part II.
22. See generally Griffin, supra note 8, at 85–99. Also see the multiple statements regarding,
inter alia, the understanding of marriage the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has
issued over the years. For example:
The redefinition of legal marriage to include any other type of relationship has serious
consequences, especially for religious freedom. It changes every law involving marital
status, requiring that other such relationships be treated as if they were the same as the
marital relationship of a man and a woman. No person or community, including religious
organizations and individuals of faith, should be forced to accept this redefinition. For
many people, accepting a redefinition of marriage would be to act against their
conscience and to deny their religious beliefs and moral convictions. Government should
protect the rights of those with differing views of marriage to express their beliefs and
convictions without fear of intimidation, marginalization or unwarranted charges that
their values imply hostility, animosity, or hatred of others.
Letter from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops to All in Positions of Public Service, The
Defense of Marriage and the Right of Religious Freedom: Reaffirming a Shared Witness (Apr. 23,
2015),
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-family/marriage/promotion-anddefense-of-marriage/defense-of-marriage-and-right-of-religious-freedom-open-letter-2015.cfm.
23. See Griffin, supra note 8, at 85–99.
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can become when religion is concerned. The French Constitution,
established with the so-called Laïcité clause in 1908, was twice
renewed—in 1946 and 1958.24 It guarantees the “free exercise of
religious worship” within the constraints of public order.25 At the same
time, the 1905 French Law on Separation of the Churches and State
excludes any state involvement in religious affairs; Article 2 describes a
French republic that “does not recognize, pay, or subsidize any [form of]
worship.”26 The French majority society had been rather comfortable
with this arrangement, shaped above all by French intellectuals who often
declared indifference or hostility towards any religion. While over the
years the Catholic Church especially succeeded in negotiating multiple
exemptions to the non-subsidy clause so that many religious services are
in fact paid for by the state, conflicts arose when the French Muslim
communities claimed the equal right to more explicit visibility in the
public sphere.27 France, like other countries, faced deep conflicts among
its citizens. With their visibility and claim to be part of the civil/public
sphere, Muslims seemed to threaten what was promoted as the French
identity; it therefore came as little surprise that France passed a law, the
so-called Loi-Stasi, in 2004.28 Over the last decade or more, however,
24. 1958 CONST. art. 10 (Fr.) (“No one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even
religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the established
Law and Order.”).
25. Loi du 9 Décembre 1905 Concernant la Séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat, art. 1 (Fr.),
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000508749&dateTexte=
20181003 (“La République assure la liberté de conscience. Elle garantit le libre exercice des cultes
sous les seules restrictions édictées ci-après dans l’intérêt de l’ordre public.”).
26. Id. art. 2.
27. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley & Alissa J. Rubin, French Muslims Say Veil Bans Give Cover to
Bias, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/world/europe/muslimfrenchwomen-struggle-with-discrimination-as-bans-on-veils-expand.html; see also, e.g., French
Muslim Student in Media Storm Over Headscarf, AL JAZEERA (May 23, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/french-muslim-student-media-storm-headscarf180523073930597.html.
28. The Loi-Stasi prohibits, for example, the public wearing of the hijab, which many regarded
as a response to growing societal tensions. LOI n° 2004-228 du 15 Mars 2004 Encadrant, en
Application du Principe de Laïcité, le Port de Signes ou de Tenues Manifestant une Appartenance
Religieuse Dans les Écoles, Collèges et Lycées Publics (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000417977&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id. Yet, in
recent years, efforts have been made, in France and throughout Europe, to acknowledge the social
transformations of the citizenry within the European Union. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION, ISLAM IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: WHAT’S AT STAKE IN THE FUTURE? iii (2007), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2007/369031/IPOL-CULT_ET(2007)369031_EN.pdf
[hereinafter
WHAT’S AT STAKE] (“Muslim presence in Europe is an uneven and unfinished process. It is an
ongoing process in the manner of all social facts. The internal articulation of European Islam is
unfinished, leaders are rare, the leadership class is in the process of being constituted, the
populations are still in the process of taking full possession of (their rights in) European public
space, with many still rendered fragile because of the difficulty and precariousness of their entry
into the space of the labour market.”).
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any effort to find prudent and practical solutions to civil conflicts have
been attacked especially by right-leaning Christian groups, insisting on
the European cultural identity that is rooted in Christianity. 29 While some
argue that open Islamophobia is on the rise, the European Union’s report
cautions against overemphasizing the rift that ignores the multiple local
resolutions—the specter of “Islamization” may well be a politically
motivated narrative that may represent less social realities than creating
a particular political narrative.30
Another public discourse concerns marriage equality, but in Europe, it
played out differently in different countries. In France, in January 2013,
hundreds of thousands of Catholics and other supporters of a so-called
traditional family model demonstrated against sexual equality and the
Marriage for All Act brought forward by French President Hollande.31 In
Germany, Spain, and Ireland, where similar laws were passed over the
last decade, no mass demonstrations of these numbers took place,
although Christian groups clearly raised their voices.32 When these
debates were lost, religious freedom arguments appeared like arguments
of last resort against a so-called “culture of death” and immorality. Just
as in Europe, in the United States conflicts of cultural changes are
dominated by Christian conservatives and the Christian Right who claim
that their identity is under attack by an increasingly secular society. 33 The
29. For a thorough analysis of the debate on “European values” and the role of the Catholic
Church in this debate of the 2000s, see CHRISTOF MANDRY, EUROPA ALS WERTEGEMEINSCHAFT:
EINE THEOLOGISCH-ETHISCHE STUDIE ZUM POLITISCHEN SELBSTVERSTÄNDNIS DER
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION (2009). For a discussion of Catholicism in France and its influence on the
Christian right, see Emma Green, Religious Leaders Condemn Family Separations—but Not
Necessarily Trump, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2018/06/why-religious-conservatives-are-calling-out-trump-on-family-separation-at-the-border/
563060/.
30. WHAT’S AT STAKE, supra note 28, at 29 (“[C]ontrary to what has been written in some
places, we continue to believe that there is no widespread or virulent current of ‘Islamophobia’ in
Europe. There is certainly no manifestation of deep-seated hostility toward Islam, no phobic hatred.
There are reactions on the surface of society and situations that are sometimes translated by
manifestations of hostility.”).
31. Steven Erlanger, Gay Marriage is Protested in France, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/27/world/europe/thousands-march-in-france-against-gaymarriage.html; see also LOI n° 2013-404 du 17 Mai 2013 Ouvrant le Mariage aux Couples de
Personnes de Même Sexe (Fr.), https://web.archive.org/web/20160115130840/http://www.
legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000027414540&dateTexte=&categorieL
ien=id (text of Marriage for All Act).
32. See, e.g., Germany Gay Marriage Approved by MPs in Snap Vote, BBC (June 30, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40441712, Spain approves gay marriage bill, BBC (last
updated Oct. 1, 2004, 14:11 GMT). The same holds true for the 2018 referendum on abortion in
Ireland. Irish Abortion Referendum: Ireland Overturns Abortion Ban, BBC (May 26, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44256152.
33. See DAMON T. BERRY, BLOOD AND FAITH: CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICAN WHITE
NATIONALISM 1–5 (2017) (analyzing the history of the claim of the “threatened identity” as part of
a Christian-nationalist political narrative in the United States). This is part of a broader narrative of
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United States Catholic bishops have embraced this argument in certain
ways, however, arguing strictly on moral, not cultural grounds.34
Same-sex marriage, they bluntly state, is against nature: “a same-sex
union contradicts the nature of marriage: It is not based on the natural
complementarity of male and female; it cannot cooperate with God to
create new life; and the natural purpose of sexual union cannot be
achieved by a same-sex union.”35
B. From the Civil Sphere to Political Decision-Making
In democracies, public debates are channeled into formal political
decisions. These must seek to integrate the insights into those policies
that strive to do justice to all citizens. In the best possible way, legislators
will weigh the different arguments as guides of their decisions and
propose laws accordingly. How exactly the transformation of public
discourse into governance and laws occurs is, however, complicated
when interest groups—with different powers and different channels of
influence—drive the political decisions, sometimes to the point of
drafting laws. The gap between the ideal of a deliberative democracy and
the reality of politics is not to be underestimated.36 But at least procedures
are available to pave the way to operationalize democratic
decision-making. Ideally, these enable citizens to hold their politicians
accountable. Yet, when the public space is “occupied” or reclaimed by
citizens, there is no guarantee that the citizens will indeed have peaceful
cohabitation in mind.37 It is for this reason that the principle of tolerance
and the equal protection of rights are so central in modern democracies.
Today—in the United States as in numerous countries in
Europe—political groups are on the rise who create a narrative that is
the nationalists who were not always aligned to Christian groups but increasingly did so over the
course of the twentieth century. The main line of argument of these nationalist groups is that not
only Christianity but also whiteness is threatened by an increasingly multicultural society. As
Damon Berry has shown, this is a pattern that has been consistently used by white nationalism
groups.
34. See Between Man and Woman: Questions and Answers About Marriage and Same-Sex
Unions, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS No. 3 (Nov. 2003), http://www.usccb.org/issues-andaction/marriage-and-family/marriage/promotion-and-defense-of-marriage/questions-and-answersabout-marriage-and-same-sex-unions.cfm (“The natural structure of human sexuality makes man
and woman complementary partners for the transmission of human life. Only a union of male and
female can express the sexual complementarity willed by God for marriage. The permanent and
exclusive commitment of marriage is the necessary context for the expression of sexual love
intended by God both to serve the transmission of human life and to build up the bond between
husband and wife.”).
35. Id. at No. 4.
36. See generally Habermas, supra note 17.
37. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 38–40
(2004) (discussing the “cosmopolitan right of hospitality” and its applicability to an influx of new
members of a sovereign).
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decidedly populist, calling for an explicit Christian national politics.38 It
is promoted together with the narrative of a threatened identity, calling
for a security politics that renders exceptional security and surveillance
measures and the accompanying law enforcement measures necessary. 39
The narrative of a Christian national identity politics is not always
coherent with the moral positions Christians take, especially not in the
field of social ethics. For example, the Catholic Church explicitly warns
against violations of human dignity and rights of Muslims, Jews,
immigrants, or refugees—yet, current United States politics steers
exactly in this direction.40 Religious freedom, the Catholic Church
claims, obliges Christians to speak out against Islamophobia,
xenophobia, and the overall criminalization of entire groups.41 The
opposite is the case. The treatment of undocumented migrants and the
policy of family separation and detention of asylum seekers is condemned
by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. But instead of
centering the debate on religious freedom on these issues and calling
Christians to civil disobedience, the Catholic Church uses the religious
freedom argument primarily when so-called liberal values around
sexuality, gender, and family norms are at stake.42 Over time, these
values—rather than advocacy for social integration and religious freedom
of all religions—have come to dominate the religious freedom debates.
C. The Return of Political Theology
While religious groups use their right to religious freedom to promote
a particular morality, political groups use religion to promote their
agenda of an American (Christian) identity. The conflation of these two
movements results in a politicization of religion under the banner of a
reinterpreted political theology. “God” serves as the “ultimate” authority
regarding normative claims; “God” is invoked to legitimize wars; and
38. These are, among others, Fidesz in Hungary, PiS (“Law and Justice”) in Poland, AfD
(“Alternative for Germany”) in Germany, the Lega Nord in Italy, or the Swedish Democrats. All of
these parties support a strictly Christian-nationalist agenda.
39. Take, as one example among many, Victor Orban’s continuing attacks on the refugee
policies in the EU. Aiming at a “Christian democracy” or “illiberal democracy,” he was the first to
close borders and build a fence during the 2015 refugee crisis. See Shaun Walker, No Entry:
Hungary’s
Crackdown
on
Helping
Refugees, GUARDIAN
(June
4,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/04/no-entry-hungarys-crackdown-on-helpingrefugees.
40. See generally Griffin, supra note 8.
41. See id. at 82–83 (citing JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 43 (1960)) (explaining that the church considers
religious freedom to be individual, and Murray’s view that “the First Amendment is not ‘articles of
faith’. . . Catholics support the First Amendment as ‘articles of peace.’”).
42. See id. at 98–103 (explaining the church’s arguments against same-sex marriage and how
those translate into Supreme Court decisions).
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“God” is invoked in the so-called culture “war” about the future of the
American society: a “war” between a so-called “liberal” morality and a
so-called “traditional” morality. 43 Sexuality, gender, and family norms
are the key symbols in this “battle” and religious freedom is its strongest
“weapon.” In reality, the majority of Catholics in the United States do not
follow, for example, the sexual morality of their church regarding
contraceptives, and Catholic women who tend to consider abortion
morally wrong still terminate pregnancies in similar numbers as other
groups.44 Regarding the social values of United States citizens,
acceptance of homosexuality is on the rise, and same-sex marriage was
supported by almost two-thirds of United States citizens in 2017, up from
one-third in the early 2000s.45 This not only means that there is a gap
between the convictions and actions of Christians, and a disconnect
between Church leaders and Church members who believe the sexual and
gender morality of the Church is simply wrong,46 but also that the issues
in the debate are more symbolic in a narrative of a “war” meant to create
the “frontlines” in a battle that is more created discursively than backed
by social facts.47 It further means that in the debates, religious freedom
becomes a political instrument. Religion is no longer upheld as one right
among other rights, such as the right to nondiscrimination, aimed to
guarantee the peaceful cohabitation of different societal groups; it is
43. James Davison Hunter, The Culture War and the Sacred/Secular Divide: The Problem of
Pluralism and Weak Hegemony, 76 SOC. RES. 1307, 1318–19 (2009).
44. According to the Guttmacher Institute Report from 2016, twenty-four percent of women
who terminated a pregnancy in 2014 were Catholic. JENNA JERMAN ET AL., CHARACTERISTICS OF
U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008, GUTTMACHER INST. (2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/characteristics-us-abortion-patients2014.pdf.
45. See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2017),
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/.
46. For some thorough arguments on sexual social ethics, see Hille Haker, A Critical Ethics of
Responsibility in the Age of HIV/AIDS and Inter-religious Dialogue, in NEGOTIATING BORDERS:
THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ERA 225 (Patrick Gnanapragasam & Elisabeth
Schüssler Fiorenza eds., 2008); HILLE HAKER, ETHIK DER GENETISCHEN FRÜHDIAGNOSTIK:
SOZIALETHISCHE REFLEXIONEN ZUR VERANTWORTUNG AM BEGINN DES MENSCHLICHEN LEBENS
(2002); Hille Haker, Catholic Feminist Ethics Reconsidered: The Case of Sex Trafficking, 43 J.
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 218 (2015).
47. Hunter, supra note 43, at 1314. Hunter argues that the framing of discursive narratives does
not necessarily reflect the lives of their supporters; instead the narratives create what Hunter calls
“weak hegemonies” that are aimed at securing the cultural domination of one group over another:
It is this effort to establish a weak hegemony that explains why so many cultural
issues have been contested politically—through litigation, lobbying, and electoral
politics. When factions employ these tools, they use the instrumentalities of the state in
order to secure the patronage of the state, its resources and, finally, its coercive power.
Needless to say, all of these instrumentalities run roughshod over the actual far-ranging
plurality of religious and cultural commitment, typically reducing them to crude
simplifications, often based upon the narrow interests of activists.
Id.
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utilized as a political weapon. At present, conservative Christian groups
use their power to undermine and undercut major legal reforms that
resulted from decades-long public debates that shifted convictions in
religious and nonreligious groups alike.48
I agree with Habermas that religions could be models for the social
integration of pluralistic societies—but this is not what we see today.49
The reason that religious freedom may indeed serve as a tool to create a
“weak hegemony,” as Hunter argues, is not only cultural.50 As I will
ultimately argue, the right to religious freedom itself requires a departure
from this political theology, and not every group is willing to follow
through.51 In the next part, however, I will focus on my own tradition,
Catholicism, and examine the relationship between ethics and politics,
and more precisely, ethics and divine, natural and positive law within
contemporary Catholic theology in the exemplary field of religious
freedom.52
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH IN MODERN
STATES
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church had lost its
claims on political power in most Western countries and focused on its
internal ecclesial affairs, alongside the pastoral and moral guidance of its
members. The medieval and early modern tradition of Catholic natural
law created a coherence between the metaphysical divine law, the natural
law of reason, and the positive law of the state. But it had been replaced
by the natural rights theory and the social contract that is based on consent
between free agents. This political-legal epistemology of the social
contract departs explicitly from the connection to divine law—however,
up to the enlightenment, it emphasizes the endowment of every human
being with reason and freedom that is ultimately grounded in the theology
of creation.53 The neo-scholastic interpretation of the nineteenth century,
however, narrowed it to a metaphysical, objective order that resulted in a
48. This Catholic Church Policy Has Been Harming Women for 50 Years, TONIC (July 26, 2018,
2:16 PM), https://tonic.vice.com/en_us/article/594yzb/catholic-church-ban-on-birth-controlhumanae-vitae (“In 1970, just two years after Humanae Vitae, two-thirds of Catholic women were
using banned methods of birth control. By 1974, 83 percent of Catholics said they disagreed with
Humanae Vitae. And, by 2008, 98 percent of Catholic women who’d had sex said they’d used a
birth control method other than natural family planning, according to the National Survey of Family
Growth.”).
49. See HABERMAS, AN AWARENESS OF WHAT IS MISSING, supra note 14 (noting that religions
could be models for the social integration of pluralistic societies).
50. Hunter, supra note 43, at 1311.
51. See infra Part II (analyzing religious freedom and the role of the church in modern states).
52. Id.
53. For more information on this topic, see CONCILIUM: HUMAN NATURE AND NATURAL LAW,
no. 3, 2010 [hereinafter HUMAN NATURE AND NATURAL LAW].
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legalistic and authoritarian “ordo-theology.” What happened in the
reductionist reading of the tradition of Christian theology was, first, that
divine justice was narrowed to divine law, spelled out in normative
commands. Then, these commands were codified into quasi-legal,
ecclesial-moral norms.
With the separation of state and religion on its way in most Western
countries, the church lacked the power of enforcement, unlike laws of a
state, and hence personal moral formation (or, as many would say, moral
disciplining) became a central task of the church. At the same time,
however, popes commented on social issues: through their encyclical
letters,54 a new social ethics emerged in the late nineteenth century,
complementing personal moral theology. Up to the Vatican II Council
(Council), it was mostly based on an ecclesial understanding of a
hierarchical church, in line with the patriarchal, antidemocratic,
anti-liberal political theory of the societas perfecta that is promoted, up
to today, by the so-called traditionalists of the Catholic Church.55
Even after the Council revised the Church’s stance towards modernity
and began to embrace a human rights oriented reinterpretation of the
natural law tradition, Catholic conscience formation was regarded mostly
in juxtaposition to the secular “modern” culture that was criticized in its
striving for a seemingly unrestricted individualized “autonomy.” 56 In his
social teachings, Pope John Paul II often referred to the secular “culture
of death,” which was repeated by Pope Benedict XVI and, though with a
more anti-capitalist twist, also by Pope Francis.57 Yet, although the neoscholastic interpretation of the natural law is still reflected in major parts
of the church’s moral theology, it also reflects a particular political
theology that was never entirely overcome in the Catholic Social
Teaching either. Dignitatis Humanae is one of the (many) documents of
the Council that symbolize the change in the 1960s; it therefore matters
to attend to the tensions within the document while not overlooking what
it tried to achieve.
A. Dignitatis Humanae
Dignitatis Humanae, On the Right of the Person and of Communities
to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious (DH) accepts religious
54. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR
JUST. & PEACE para. 8 (2004), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/
documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
55. An important figure in this group, Cardinal Gerhard Ludwig Müller, became the Prefect of
the Congregation of Faith in 2012, leaving the office in 2017.
56. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (Mar. 25, 1995), http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangeliumvitae_en.html [hereinafter Evangelium Vitae].
57. See, e.g., Laudato Si’, supra note 5.
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pluralism as the context in which religious freedom is spelled out. 58 The
overall goal is to ensure that people and groups, religious and
nonreligious, can live together in peace, working for the common good.59
This aim of peaceful cohabitation and cooperation for the common good
coincides with the purpose of the secular state according to modern
political theory.60 It means that no church or religious group can claim to
be, as Leslie Griffin states, “a valid legal or political ideal.”61 DH does
argue, however, that the state has a particular duty regarding religion: it
must secure individuals’ freedom of religion and religious institutions’
freedom of religion.62 It must not interfere with the church’s truth claims
and/or individuals’ expressions of conscience.63
Furthermore, society has the right to defend itself against possible
abuses committed on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special
duty of government to provide this protection. However, government is
not to act in an arbitrary fashion or in an unfair spirit of partisanship. Its
action is to be controlled by juridical norms which are in conformity with
the objective moral order. These norms arise out of the need for the
effective safeguard of the rights of all citizens and for the peaceful
settlement of conflicts of rights; the need for an adequate care of genuine
public peace, which comes about when men live together in good order
and in true justice; and finally, the need for a proper guardianship of
public morality.64
At the Council, DH, drafted mostly by John Courtney Murray, was the
result of modern political history since the French Revolution, in which
different models of the church-state relationship had emerged in different
countries. I argue that one must consider these different national
constellations in order to understand the debate before and during the
Vatican II Council. After all, just as Murray reflected upon the American
arrangement, other participants, too, came to the deliberations with their
own national experiences.65 Given the dominance of European
participants at the Council, it may be possible to discern several different
58. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae, Declaration on Religious Freedom para. 15 (Dec. 7,
1965),
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_
19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html [hereinafter Dignitatis Humanae].
59. Id.
60. See Griffin, supra note 8, at 84 (noting that “people of different faiths can find political
common ground even while agreeing to disagree about theology,” and explaining that Americans
believe it is not the state’s duty to make faith determinations).
61. Id.
62. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 58, para. 6.
63. Id.
64. Id. para. 7.
65. See generally JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (2005).
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models that reflected political realities, from the identification of faith
and state to the complete severance of any ties. Seen in its historical
context, the adopted model of DH is indeed a major achievement. One
model the church knew well was France’s laicist or agnostic state that
severs any positive tie between the state and religions.66 Here, religious
freedom is strictly a negative right; it was not a model the Council could
have followed without putting its major public institutions in different
societies, such as schools or hospitals, at risk.
Another, albeit extreme, alternative was pursued in Franco’s Spain
after the Civil War that ended the short time in which Spain followed
France in severing its ties to the Church; Franco returned to the nineteenth
century stance that privileged the Catholic Church; the fascist state was
defined as a Catholic nation, and during the time of the Council, Franco’s
dictatorship was still in place (it ended only in 1975). 67 Siding with
Franco, the Catholics tried to regain their lost influence: “In nationalist
Spain, the story of clerical support for Franco during the war is well
known. Behind the rhetoric of the ‘great spiritual crusade,’ the Spanish
Catholic Church saw an opportunity for rechristianizing the nation that
had appeared impossible . . . .”68 Pastor quotes from a Franco speech
affirming that Spain was a Catholic nation: “When the nations have
received from God the privilege of possessing a single faith, and when
they all speak the language of the true religion, no concessions can be
made to error.”69
A third model was the Soviet Union’s declared atheism. It was a
reminder of the ever-possible control of the church by the state known up
to today from the experience of the Catholic Church in China, and/or the
persecution of the (predominant) Christian Orthodox Church and
religious minorities in Russia.70 This context certainly increased the
urgency to come to a resolution at the Council.
The fourth model, the United States’ secular state that guarantees
religious freedom under the auspices of the separation of church and state,
66. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
67. It is no secret that the Spanish clergy mostly supported Franco’s regime, and it might
therefore have served as the model for the course of the church in the 1960s, especially because the
situation was not much different in South America. However, it would have come with the price of
an ongoing intrareligious conflict between different Christian groups in several societies, as well
as interreligious conflicts. For the historical context of Spain’s clergy under Franco, see Eugenia
Relaño Pastor, Spanish Catholic Church in Franco Regime: A Marriage of Convenience, 20
KIRCHLICHE ZEITGESCHICHTE 275 (2007).
68. Id. at 279.
69. Id.
70. See Revelations from the Russian Archives: Anti-Religious Campaigns, LIBR. OF CONGRESS
(Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/anti.html (explaining the reactions to the
Soviet Union’s declared atheism by the rest of the world).
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while welcoming religion in the civil and public life, ultimately emerged
as the model DH used as background. It guaranteed both negative and
positive freedom, did not privilege one religion over another, and still left
enough room for the church to flourish in the civil sphere. Remembering
this landscape of church-state relations at the time of the Council, I am
only interested in the underlying political theology, as defined in the
section above.
DH spells out the natural law in terms of human dignity. 71 But the
concept itself is ambiguous, shifting between the freedom of conscience,
addressed mainly as protection against any coercion by laws, and dignity
that is interpreted with the authority of the Church in discerning moral
truths. The following quote is an example:
For the Church is, by the will of Christ, the teacher of the truth. It is her
duty to give utterance to, and authoritatively to teach, that truth which
is Christ Himself, and also to declare and confirm by her authority those
principles of the moral order which have their origins in human nature
itself.72

In other words, the Catholic Church argues that human dignity
functions as the metaphysical presupposition of the secular state, thus
providing the legislator with a criterion to discern whether a given law is
in fact “in conformity with the objective moral order”—that is, coherent
with dignity spelled out as the principle of natural law. 73 The ambiguity
regarding the natural law tradition continues up to today; it therefore
looms in the background of the understanding of the church-state
relationship with respect to the right to religious freedom.
B. Natural Law and Human Rights
Human dignity is the core principle of Catholic ethics, and its violation
requires the solidarity of the Church. In an astonishing parallel, Pope John
Paul II compared the Catholic solidarity with impoverished European
workers in the nineteenth century with the protection of “another category
of persons . . . being oppressed” in the twentieth century—namely, the
human embryo.74 This priority may explain why sexual morality became
71.
72.
73.
74.

Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 58, para. 1.
Id. para. 14.
Id. para. 7.
William Levada, Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Bioethical Questions,
CONGRETATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH para. 37 (2008), http://www.vatican.va/
roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_dignitas-personae_
en.html (quoting Letter from John Paul II to all the Bishops on The Gospel of Life (May 19, 1991)).
Just as a century ago it was the working classes which were oppressed in their
fundamental rights, and the Church courageously came to their defense by proclaiming
the sacrosanct rights of the worker as person, so now, when another category of persons
is being oppressed in the fundamental right to life, the Church feels in duty bound to
speak out with the same courage on behalf of those who have no voice. Hers is always
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such an obsession of Catholic moral theology over the last fifty years,
strictly shaped in relation to the sacrament of marriage.75 Contraceptives,
abortion, and human embryo protection dominated the moral debates
throughout the papacies from Paul VI to Benedict XVI and continued
even after the devastating scandal of sexual abuse finally became public
knowledge in the early 2000s.76 In all these cases, human dignity is at
stake. For example, the 2008 Instruction by Pope Benedict, Dignitas
Personae, affirms Pope John Paul II’s approach to reproductive
medicine, identifying human embryo protection as the twentieth century
question of Catholic Social Teaching (CST).77 This is certainly a striking
statement, prioritizing human embryo protection over all the other global
issues also addressed in CST, such as hunger, poverty, migration, or
climate change. By the turn of the century, the questions of gender,
homosexuality, and same-sex marriage were increasingly addressed by
the Church, often under the headline of “gender ideology.” 78 The United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops seems to also follow this
interpretation. For example, in its statement on marriage, it referred both
to the Canon Law and to the Catechism of the Church but, quite tellingly,
not to the human rights framework.79
And yet, despite the ongoing presence of neo-scholastic
interpretations, the natural law doctrine has been considerably
reinterpreted, bringing it much closer to the human rights framework than
was the case in the Magisterium’s twentieth century interpretation of
moral theology.80 This has been documented, most importantly, in the
the evangelical cry in defense of the world’s poor, those who are threatened and despised
and whose human rights are violated.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Love and Sexuality, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/beliefsand-teachings/what-we-believe/love-and-sexuality/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2018)
(explaining the “gift of sexual difference” between men and women and its implications in
marriage).
76. See Hille Haker, Catholic Sexual Ethics—a Necessary Revision: Theological Responses to
the Sexual Abuse Scandal, CONCILIUM: HUMAN TRAFFICKING, no. 3, 2011, at 128. Ironically,
Thomas Aquinas—otherwise quoted as “the” doctor of Catholic moral theology—only mentions
abortion in passing, and even when he does, he does not distinguish between intentional and
unintentional loss of pregnancy. Cf. ROBERT PASNAU, THOMAS AQUINAS ON HUMAN NATURE
(2002).
77. See Levada, supra note 74, paras. 2–3.
78. “Gender Theory”/“Gender Ideology”—Select Teaching Resources, U.S. CONF. OF CATH.
BISHOPS (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-family/marriage/
promotion-and-defense-of-marriage/upload/Gender-Ideology-Select-Teaching-Resources.pdf.
79. For a comprehensive overview of the two main interpretation lines of natural law—the
“metaphysical objectivistic” interpretation and the “deontological, critical or moderate”
interpretation that is aligned to the human rights tradition, drawing on the natural law tradition in
Spain and Portugal, see Antonio-Enrique Pérez Luño, Natural Law Theory in Spain and Portugal,
1 AGE HUM. RTS. J. 1, 12 (2013).
80. See In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law, INT’L THEOLOGICAL
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International Theological Commission’s (Commission) 2009
document.81 While this reinterpretation is a much welcome move, the
tension between the “ethical” paradigm and the “metaphysical” natural
law paradigm still is not entirely overcome. The Commission still refers
to natural law as “objective law” that responds to the order of nature,
which is seen in accordance with eternal law.82 The only change is that
this order is now interpreted in view of human rights.83 Addressing the
relationship between the (moral) natural law and the positive (legal) laws
issued in secular societies, the “norms of natural justice [law],” 84 the
Commission argues, are to be directly translated into positive law; when
this is the case, they are not only legally, but also morally binding:
Positive law must strive to carry out the norm of natural justice [natural
law]. It does this either by way of conclusions (natural justice forbids
homicide, positive law prohibits abortion), or by way of determination
(natural justice [natural law] prescribes that the guilty be punished,
positive penal law determines the punishments to be applied in each
category of crime.) Inasmuch as they truly derive from the norm of
natural justice [natural law] and therefore from the eternal law, positive
human laws are binding in conscience.85

Not surprisingly, however, the Commission still grapples with the
potential clashes between positive law and natural law; after all, human
history demonstrates that the two do not necessarily coincide. Therefore,
the Commission cautions to identify both, insisting on the superiority of
the natural law over the positive law:
The norms of natural justice [natural law] are thus the measures of
human relationships prior to the will of the legislator. They are given
from the moment that human beings live in society. They express what
is naturally just, prior to any legal formulation. The norms of natural
justice [natural law] are expressed in a particular way in the subjective
rights of the human person, such as the right to respect for one’s own
life, the right to the integrity of one’s person, the right to religious
liberty, the right to freedom of thought, the right to start a family and to
educate one’s children according to one’s convictions, the right to
associate with others, the right to participate in the life of the
community, etc. These rights, to which contemporary thought attributes
great importance, do not have their source in the fluctuating desires of
COMM’N para. 34 (2009), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/
rc_con_cfaith_doc_20090520_legge-naturale_en.html [hereinafter In Search of a Universal Ethic]
(describing the evolution of the natural law doctrine’s interpretations).
81. See generally id.
82. Id. para. 35.
83. Id. para. 5–6.
84. Id. para. 92. This is an adjusted translation to the term, lex naturalis, used in the 2009
document.
85. Id. para. 91.
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individuals, but rather in the very structure of human beings and their
humanizing relations. The rights of the human person emerge therefore
from the order of justice [law] that must reign in relations among human
beings. To acknowledge these natural rights of man means to
acknowledge the objective order of human relations based on the
natural law.86

In the opposite case, they are not binding. “If the law is not just, it is
not even a law.”87 With this statement, the question of who has the
authority to interpret the moral conformity of laws with the natural law is
put back on the table. But if the core principle of the natural law tradition,
reinterpreted in line with human rights, is human dignity, it is crucial to
overcome the ambiguity that accompanies this concept.
C. Human Dignity and Political Ethics
Whether today it is possible to “save” the natural law tradition in its
“moderate” version is contested.88 Pope Francis certainly has shifted the
emphasis of human dignity from sexual morality to the major global
crises, even though he faces constant attacks by “traditionalists” who, like
prominent bishops in Poland, Hungary, and the United States,
unsurprisingly are close to the nationalist movements in their countries
who reject core values underlying liberal democracies.89 I argue,
however, that even Pope Francis’s understanding of his central
theological concept, mercy,90 overlooks the tension between the
metaphysical and the ethical interpretation of Catholic morality: it still
does not succeed in shifting the political theology that is tied to the
neo-scholastic natural law tradition to what Antonio-Enrique Pérez Luño

86. Id. para. 92 (emphasis added).
87. Id. para. 91.
88. See generally HUMAN NATURE AND NATURAL LAW, supra note 53.
89. See, e.g., Mark Hosenball, Steve Bannon Drafting Curriculum for Right-Wing Catholic
Institute in Italy, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2018, 4:47 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eupolitics-bannon-catholics/steve-bannon-drafting-curriculum-for-right-wing-catholic-institute-initaly-idUSKCN1LU176 (discussing the connection between the Dignitatis Humanae Institute and
Steve Bannon); Astrid Prange, How the Catholic Church Ties in to Poland’s Judicial Reform,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 24, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-catholic-church-ties-in-topolands-judicial-reform/a-39809383 (discussing the close ties between PiS and clergy in Poland).
Hungary’s relation to the Catholic Church is more complicated, because Victor Orban has taken
control over which churches can exist in Hungary while putting his political (and financial) support
behind the Catholic Church. See Church and State in Orbán’s Hungary, HUNGARIAN SPECTRUM
(Jan. 16, 2018), http://hungarianspectrum.org/2018/01/16/church-and-state-in-orbans-hungary/;
see also Benjamin Novak, Churches Get Another USD 30 Million in the Run-up to the General
Election, BUDAPEST BEACON (Feb. 15, 2018), https://budapestbeacon.com/churches-gets-anotherusd-30-million-run-general-election/.
90. His approach owes much to Walter Kasper’s book on “Mercy” from 2013. See generally
WALTER KASPER, MERCY: THE ESSENCE OF THE GOSPEL AND THE KEY TO CHRISTIAN LIFE
(William Madges trans., Paulist Press 2014) (2013).
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called its “deontological, critical, or moderate” interpretation.91 Rather,
Pope Francis shifts the focus to a pastoral interpretation of norms. The
problem, however, is that he thereby evades clarifying the difficult
relation between natural law, natural rights, and justice. As long as the
concept of mercy is formulated in analogy to the “pardoning” power of a
judge, applied to the ecclesial-legal framework of Canon Law that is
otherwise untouched by such acts of (pastoral) mercy, the broader ethical
concept of human dignity and justice is still concealed.92 The pastoral
solution that Pope Francis puts forward in several areas of conflict, such
as divorce, homosexuality, or the use of contraceptives, still rests upon
the authority of the pope, which can easily be revised in the future. 93 It
does not shift the emphasis from the moral authority represented by the
Magisterium to a political ethics that is centered on moral freedom and
responsibility for justice.94
In the Hebrew bible, however, divine justice is not first and foremost
a legal term; it is also not primarily linked to the concept of a “pardoning”
mercy regarding the guilt of persons.95 Instead, it is linked to compassion
for suffering people, as Metz has posited against Walter Kasper, who
argues that both concepts can be used interchangeably. 96 The Hebrew
term that links justice and compassion is rahamim, meaning the feeling
of the pain of those who are suffering in the “womb” (not the heart, as in
the Latin term misericordia), com-passion or suffering with those who
are morally harmed, socially marginalized, or oppressed.97 Divine
compassion is linked as well to the rectification of injustice as to the
reassurance that for any fallible human being, including those who fail to
live up to their moral freedom, new beginnings are always possible.98
91. Put in context:
I have always found it appropriate to distinguish between an ontological, dogmatic or
radical Natural Law, which defends a metaphysically objectivistic order from which
absolute and extemporal values may be deduced; and a deontological, critical or
moderate Natural Law, which does not deny legal character to unfair Positive Law, but
establishes certain criteria in order to assess such a regulation and therefore set grounds
for its criticism and substitution by a just system.
Pérez Luño, supra note 79, at 12.
92. See Hille Haker, Compassion and Justice, CONCILIUM: MERCY, no. 4, 2017, at 54
(critiquing this pastoral approach).
93. See
generally
Pope
Francis,
Amoris
Lœtita
(Mar.
19,
2016),
https://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_
esortazione-ap_20160319_amoris-laetitia_en.pdf (discussing Pope Francis’s approach to conflict
within the Catholic faith).
94. See generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE (2011).
95. See Johann Baptist Metz, Facing the World: A Theological and Biographical Inquiry, 75
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 23, 27 (2014) (discussing divine justice centered around compassion).
96. Id.
97. See Haker, supra note 92, at 57 (defining the Hebrew term linking justice and compassion).
98. Id.; cf. PAUL RICŒUR, MEMORY, HISTORY, FORGETTING (Kathleen Blamey & David
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I belong to those who depart from the natural law tradition in order to
emphasize this necessary shift of the ethics framework, opening the
debate to a new understanding of human dignity that is defined by
vulnerable agency, compassion and justice rather than by obedience, law
and mercy.99 In a nutshell, the concept of dignity points to the human
condition of vulnerability and agency; both dimensions are captured in
the moral concept of dignity. On the one hand, the human condition of
vulnerability renders humans susceptible to suffering caused by illness or
bad luck; as social beings, however, vulnerability also renders them
susceptible to moral harm by others, in acts of disrespect, shame,
humiliation, and the many forms of violence against their body and
personal integrity; finally, human vulnerability is increased by social
states of precariousness, distributed unequally between individuals and
groups.
On the other hand, human beings are defined by their agency; they are
“capable human beings,” as Paul Ricœur calls it, pointing to the potency
of human beings to bring about changes through their actions, to be
effective and affect others.100 As social beings, we are addressed and
respond to others in our communications and actions. Actions, this
means, are already and necessarily reactions, responses to the other or
others, rendering agents “entangled in stories” that others have begun to
write for them.101 Human beings always start in the middle of a story, not
at the beginning. Human dignity is therefore not a metaphysical concept
that relates to a metaphysical order but a moral concept that relates to our
situated vulnerable agency in the “here” and “now.” It correlates the
needs, desires, and rights of vulnerable human beings with their
responsibilities as agents. It obliges agents to respond to others in ways
that mitigate their ontological vulnerability (to diseases, age-related
dependencies, etc.) that avoid moral harms, and that reduce the states of
precariousness.
This short summary of a complex phenomenology of vulnerable
agency explains why human dignity goes far beyond the autonomy as
self-centered pursuit of happiness, but also, in Kant’s term, beyond

Pellauer trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2004) (explaining the link between divine compassion and the
rectification of injustice).
99. Hille Haker, Political Theologies in a Post-Christian World, in T&T CLARK COMPANION
TO POLITICAL THEOLOGY 950 (Rubén Rosario-Rodríguez ed., 2019); cf. also J. M. BERNSTEIN,
TORTURE AND DIGNITY: AN ESSAY ON MORAL INJURY (2015).
100. See PAUL RICŒUR, THE COURSE OF RECOGNITION 89–99 (David Pellauer trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 2005) (2004) (defining “capable human beings” as having the potency to bring about
changes through their actions).
101. WILHELM SCHAPP, IN GESCHICHTEN VERSTRICKT: ZUM SEIN VON MENSCH UND DING
(Meiner 1953).
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autonomy as self-legislation.102 Religions articulate and reflect the
human condition as a moral condition in multiple narratives that spell out
human dignity as God’s gift and claim to respond to this call by
responding to and caring for others. Theological dignity does not change
the concept of dignity that is spelled out in different forms as narratives
or philosophical analyses; it does, however, change the embeddedness in
a particular tradition and ethics. Politically speaking, the goal of any state
is to enable the peaceful cohabitation of those who live within its borders,
and the same goal holds true for the international order. A theology that
rests upon dignity and justice, understood as the effort to enable
everybody to live a decent life, with and for others, in just institutions,
requires standing with those whose dignity is violated, and for whom a
decent life is made impossible by the decisions of those who do not see
them, or do not see them as relevant to their own projects.
D. Laws and Justice Reconsidered
The Catholic Church regards some United States laws as unjustified in
the name of “natural rights of man” which must necessarily
“acknowledge the objective order of human relations based on the natural
law.”103 Among these are the death penalty, the right to abortion, or the
same-sex marriage law. It does not matter right now whether one agrees
with these judgments—the question is whether the generalized reference
to the “objective order of human relations” suffices as the ultimate
criterion to claim exemptions from the law for the reason of religious
freedom.104 What would happen, for example, when another religion
disagreed with democracy, or the right to education for girls with the
same claim of an objective order? Heiner Bielefeld, human rights scholar
and former UN Rapporteur for Human Rights, warns that a
nondiscriminatory protection of religious freedom—meaning the
protection of all religions—is only possible in a secular state.105 It must
not be viewed in the abstract but viewed strictly in concrete conflicts. 106
This warning, I argue, must serve as a guide to the current treatment of
the religious freedom rights in the United States, because it broadens the
discussion to the protection and religious freedom rights of Judaism,
Islam, and all other minority religions.
102. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(Mary Gregor & Jens Timmerman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) (1786) (discussing autonomy
as self-legislation).
103. In Search of a Universal Ethic, supra note 80, para. 92.
104. Id.
105. See generally Heiner Bielefeldt, Freedom of Religion or Belief—A Human Right Under
Pressure, 1 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 15 (2012).
106. Heiner Bielefeldt, Bedrohtes Menschenrecht: Erfahrungen mit der Religionsfreiheit, 60
HERDER KORRESPONDENZ 65, 65–69 (2006).
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Political decisions are, as we know, based on compromises. It is the
task of practical moral reasoning, often informing social conflicts in the
civil sphere, and juridical reasoning, to provide judgment that allows for
justified decisions, taking into consideration the circumstances and
available options. Catholic ethics can turn to its own rich tradition of
contextual practical reasoning. Reason, remembrance, docility, caution,
foresight, or the regard for circumstances are called middle principles that
enable moral judgments that are prudent for a reason:107 they direct the
concrete normative assessments in a given situation—sometimes as
concrete as a baker’s concern who does not want to bake a wedding cake
for a gay couple, because he cannot tolerate their (lawful) marriage that
he claims he cannot support in any way. This view presupposes that the
baker indeed supports the values the gay couple holds when he treats
them as his customers. But this argument misunderstands that tolerance
does not accept the other’s view; rather, it respects others in their right to
marry, because it is legal, and tolerates their views as part of the plurality
and differences of values and lifestyles. There will always be values one
disagrees with; the question is whether one can tolerate them. The laws
are meant to orient citizens in this navigation, to wit, demonstrating to
them which values or practices they must tolerate.108
Ultimately, however, it is the state’s responsibility to guarantee that
laws are enforced so that all citizens live under the rule of law. This must
be guided by the duty to treat all citizens as equal before the law. DH
explicitly affirms this as the duty of the state.
Finally, government is to see to it that equality of citizens before the
law, which is itself an element of the common good, is never violated,
whether openly or covertly, for religious reasons. Nor is there to be
discrimination among citizens.109
The examples Leslie Griffin provides of the current interpretations of
religious freedom, however, show equality is exactly what is at stake.110
It is here that the church’s claim to be the teacher of the truth, obliged “to
declare and confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order

107. These are, according to Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae II-II, elements of prudence;
they were later used in the casuistry of moral theology. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGIÆ: A CONCISE TRANSLATION 376–82 (Timothy McDermott ed., 1991).
108. This is not to say that one may not still morally disagree with a law—that is the normal
process in democracies. See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). On the basis of the baker’s argument, a doctor must be able to be exempted
from performing an emergency surgery for religious reasons—and even though one wants to
respect conscientious objections, these cannot redefine the rules or laws of the land.
109. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 58, para. 6.
110. See generally Griffin, supra note 8 (detailing numerous interpretations of religious
freedom which intersect with individual rights).

130

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

which have their origins in human nature itself,” 111 reaffirms the
objectivist position, to wit, that the church, not the state, is the arbiter of
moral conflicts. The church fosters this perception (a) by using the power
of its public voice and self-describing as the voice of conscience, for
example, calling for a “culture of life” in a culture that is a “culture of
death,”112 and (b) by expanding the already granted religious exemptions
from the law to ever-more areas of social life.
In these debates, theologians serve a crucial role: first, they must
critique the priorities in the debate on religious freedom. If today Islam is
the target of multiple attacks, fostered and amplified by the United States
administration’s rhetoric, policies, and shifts in laws, Christians are
indeed obliged, in the name of the right to freedom of religion, to speak
up and stand with all those groups and individuals under attack. Second,
theologians must contribute to the concrete theological and ethical
judgments brought forward in legal cases. The natural law tradition is
right in claiming that human rights, including religious freedom rights,
are indeed never entirely captured by legal rights; the philosophy of law
and ethics are overlapping but not identical.113 The legal perspective must
be constantly correlated, and potentially critiqued, by the broader moral
perspective that emphasizes human dignity, now understood as
vulnerable agency, and justice, starting with those whose dignity is under
attack and who are facing injustices. When the church’s judgments are
considered wrong for ethical reasons (as I believe they are with respect
to many questions of sexual and gender ethics), Christian ethicists must
speak up—and the church must listen to them in the forum internum.
Third, theologians must remind the church, in its role as an authority in
conscience formation, that persons’ moral beliefs are protected
theologically, to wit, as freedom of conscience, and must be formed in
view of human dignity.114 Finally, theologians must bring to light the
underlying political theology of the “traditionalist” interpretation of
111. Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 58, para. 14.
112. See generally Evangelium Vitae, supra note 56 (discussing the “culture of life”
throughout).
113. For a different view, see JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS (Meir
Dan-Cohen ed., 2012).
114. It should be noted that the medieval natural law tradition, too, insists on the freedom of
conscience, as does the Catechism of the Catholic Church—however, it treats it in the context of
an “erring conscience,” referring to the objective moral order. Dignitatis Humanae explicitly states:
On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through
the mediation of conscience. In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience
in order that he may come to God, the end and purpose of life. It follows that he is not
to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience. Nor, on the other hand, is he
to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in matters
religious.
Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 58, para. 3.
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natural law that threatens not only the equilibrium between the secular
state and religions but also revises the hard-won reforms of the Vatican
II Council.
III. THE POLITICIZATION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Leslie Griffin offers a pointed analysis of the current conflicts of
religious freedom rights.115 As she has shown, the United States Supreme
Court and multiple state laws go along with arguments presented largely
by the Catholic Church and several Protestant denominations, which in
my view question the foundations and principles of church-state relations.
Under the headline of “religious exemptions,” Christian groups promote
a broad noncompliance with some laws, and they thereby tolerate
discrimination of people in the name of the protection of religious
freedom.116 Exempting a religion (or any group) from a law that itself
guarantees equal rights—as is the case in equal marriage law, for
example—contradicts the very purpose of the law. If this is the case, this
undermines the United States Supreme Court’s very authority: at once
standing with the groups protected by the law in the name of equality and
with the group that argues this equality violates its rights is impossible.
The criticized practices—use of contraceptives, reproductive rights, and
right to marry—must be accessible and open to all citizens, independent
of their religious convictions. The principle of equality does not allow for
unequal access lest it create new injustices. But because religious
organizations see a conflict between the positive law and morality, they
question not only the moral rightness but in fact the legality of the laws:
“If the law is not just, it is not even a law.”117 This, however, only holds
true if there is a direct line from divine law to natural law and to positive
law. In effect, religious groups try to enforce their own “laws”—the
moral norms—upon their members, broadening the scope of religious
exemptions ever-more to employees, students, and even the staff of
companies, as Griffin shows.118 In addition to conflating moral norms
that are bound by freedom of conscience with enforceable laws, no state
can allow a religious group to decide what counts as a legitimate law. The
place for dissent is the public sphere, not the courts. In fact, the statement
“[i]f the law is not just, it is not even a law”119 must correctly read “if a
115. See Griffin, supra note 8, at 85–91 (discussing religious exemptions and religious conflicts
with law).
116. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
188 (2012) (affirming the ministerial exception to labor law that exempts religious organizations
from following certain laws when hiring and terminating ministers). For a more in-depth discussion
on this topic, see Griffin, supra note 8, at 85–91.
117. In Search of a Universal Ethic, supra note 80, para. 91.
118. See Griffin, supra note 8, at 85–91.
119. See In Search of a Universal Ethic, supra note 80, para. 91.
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law violates the dignity and rights of human beings in their vulnerability
and agency, it cannot be just.” In this case, the conscientious objection
does not refer to an abstract moral order but to the concrete violation of
dignity. To answer whether a law does indeed violate the dignity and
rights of others, one needs to listen to those who are most affected by it
and integrate the above-mentioned middle principles and reference points
of practical reasoning.120
I certainly do not want to argue that laws are always just. I agree, for
example, with the Catholic Church’s position on the death penalty. 121
Civil disobedience may, in extreme cases, be indeed an obligation—but
groups, religious or not, normally acknowledge the transgression of a
law, bearing the legal consequences. An overly broad interpretation of
the exemption clause for religious groups within the legal framework, in
contrast, is an attempt to have the cake and eat it too: resisting the law of
the land with the blessing of the courts. Leslie Griffin points to the
multiple exemptions that demonstrate how powerful the strategic
invocation of the right to religious freedom has become.122 When basic
rights of others are concerned, the state and its courts must, however, be
sensitive in their decisions, even when they require a case-by-case
consideration.
The current wave of populist nationalism is intertwined with (white)
Christian identity politics, however, and this wave reveals yet another
complication: political offices seem to increasingly favor one particular
religious tradition, namely the Christian tradition, while discriminating
against another, namely Islam. In this case, the defense of a particular
religious identity in the name of religious freedom rights is, as I said,
echoed by a state-driven political theology. In this vein, Attorney General
Jeff Sessions introduced a Religious Liberty Task Force in July 2018,
claiming an emergency of religious liberty:
A dangerous movement, undetected by many, is now challenging and
eroding our great tradition of religious freedom. There can be no doubt.
This is no little matter. It must be confronted and defeated. This
election, and much that has flowed from it, gives us a rare opportunity
to arrest these trends. Such a reversal will not just be done with electoral
victories, but by intellectual victories. We have gotten to the point
where courts have held that morality cannot be a basis for law; where
ministers are fearful to affirm, as they understand it, holy writ from the
120. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
121. See Catechism of the Catholic Church, pt. 3, para. 2267, http://www.vatican.va/
archive/ENG0015/_P7Z.HTM (describing the use of the death penalty as a last resort).
122. See generally Griffin, supra note 8 (outlining religious exemptions in labor laws for
religious institutions, for businesses refusing services due to not wanting to ratify same-sex
marriage, and corporate exemptions from providing contraceptives in their healthcare plans under
the Affordable Care Act).
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pulpit; and where one group can actively target religious groups by
labeling them a “hate group” on the basis of their sincerely held
religious beliefs. This President and this Department of Justice are
determined to protect and even advance this magnificent heritage.123

According to the White House website, the Trump administration has
promoted religious rights aggressively.124 While the website does not
state it, most of the measures take up the demands of Christian groups.125
CONCLUSION
Religious freedom is a precious right, securing the dignity of persons
and the rights of religious groups to exercise their beliefs privately, in
their religious communities, and publicly. Regarding its own moral
teachings, the Catholic Church that I have primarily addressed in this
essay must adhere to its own principle of human dignity and human
freedom. When religious groups force their beliefs or practices upon
citizens, employees, clients, or patients, even though these concern rights
otherwise protected by state law, they easily misinterpret this most
fundamental principle and misunderstand their role in the public sphere.
Moral conflicts require practical moral reasoning, based on the respect of
others and tolerance of other views. One of the greatest insights of the
religious understanding of the concept of dignity is that God-given
freedom is reflected in the conscience of the moral agent; conscience, not
the authority of the Church, is the ultimate reference that a person must
abide by. In the Christian understanding, freedom must be the freedom of
the other, independent of whether the other is a moral friend or a moral
stranger.126 If the positive law of nation-states and justice always
123. Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Department of Justice’s
Religious Liberty Summit (July 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-generalsessions-delivers-remarks-department-justice-s-religious-liberty-summit.
124. See generally President Trump Has Been a Champion for Religious Freedom,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/presidenttrump-champion-religious-freedom/.
125. See id. The examples of religious freedom rights refer entirely to the rights of Christian
groups; for example, to be exempted from provisions of the Affordable Care Act or abortion rights.
See id. They mention, for example, antisemitism and/or hate crimes against Muslims, but they do
not indicate that the protection of these religions’ positive rights are a priority, too. Id. In his speech
announcing the Religious Liberty Task Force, Attorney General Sessions repeatedly referenced
religious liberty court cases. Sessions, supra note 123. He said, for example: “But in recent years,
the cultural climate in this country—and in the West more generally—has become less hospitable
to people of faith. Many Americans have felt that their freedom to practice their faith has been
under attack.” Id. While not mentioning one religion in particular, the whole context—and the
examples—clearly points to what religion and what tradition he has in mind: “In substance, he
[President Trump] said he respected people of faith and he promised to protect them in the free
exercise of their faith. He declared we would say ‘Merry Christmas’ again.” Id. Sessions announced
Archbishop Kurtz who spoke after him, welcoming the close relationship between the Trump
administration and the Catholic Church. Id.
126. See THOMAS PRÖPPER, THEOLOGISCHE ANTHROPOLOGIE (2011) (explaining how, in the
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coincided, legal reforms would be unnecessary. The space to politically
dissent to laws is the civil sphere; the source for moral dissent is,
ultimately, the moral freedom of the moral agent.
When individuals are discriminated against in their dignity or freedom,
the state must intervene—and secure their rights, whether religious or
nonreligious. At times, the state must constrain or limit the freedom rights
of a religious group “in the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others,” as the European Convention of Human Rights, for
example, states.127 All this is in line with DH.128
With Heiner Bielefeld, I argue that conflicts of human rights must be
addressed only in view of concrete conflicts between human rights.129
The argument that certain lawful practices are offenses to religious values
is not sufficient to be exempted from legal requirements; in fact, many
people are often offended by certain laws and still need to abide by them.
In many cases, religious people (or religious organizations, or the
Catholic Church) are not directly affected in the exercise of their religion
by the lives or conduct of others; while in contrast, people on the other
side—women, those who identify as homosexual, transgender, or gender
nonconforming—are directly affected by the often discriminatory tone in
the discussion of gender equality and certainly by the acts and practices
of members of the religious communities who condemn their practices,
as if these could be separated from the agents who practice them. It is not
only the task of the state but also morally right to protect these groups,
already vulnerable to discrimination, against disrespect, misrecognition,
and humiliation. Because contexts matter, their vulnerability must take
priority over the remote vulnerability, for example, of a baker who wishes
his customers to disappear from his world of commerce.130 It may well
be possible that compromises can be found with respect to certain
practices; after all, this is what prudent practical moral reasoning would
call for. But conflicting parties may also deliberately escalate the conflict
and use their arguments strategically. It is then up to the courts—the only
authority in a polity that decides on legitimate and illegitimate (not
Christian understanding, freedom is independant of morality); cf. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY (MIT Press 1998) (1996) (discussing
the same idea from a philosophical perspective).
127. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 9 (noting that the determination
whether a limitation is necessary or legitimate is the responsibility of the courts).
128. See generally Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 58.
129. Bielefeldt, supra note 106, at 65–69.
130. The same attitude is reflected when members of Congress or the Trump administration are
publicly shamed and denied services—for example, in restaurants. They should not be granted the
freedom “not to serve” a customer because of their beliefs either. Civil peace does not rest upon
agreement; it rests upon the respect and tolerance of others.
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necessarily just or unjust) claims—to secure the peaceful cohabitation
among groups with different values.
Let me use a spatial metaphor to make a final point: the public space
is never empty; it is always already “occupied” and filled with many
voices that compete in their narratives of “good” and “bad” visions of
life, or “right” and “wrong” practices.131 Religious freedom—as any
freedom—is an endowment that comes with the price of moral
responsibility. Christian ethics obliges Christians to attend exactly to
those who are inaudible, invisible, “thrown away,” often into the darkest
places in society, “hiding from humanity” as Martha Nussbaum aptly
calls it.132 Knowing and acknowledging this, whoever has the privilege
of being granted in their polity the right to religious freedom—and all
other human rights—is obliged in return to stand in solidarity with those
whose human rights are denied and whose dignity is violated. Creating a
space for everyone in the public sphere and claiming the rights for those
who have no rights entails the duty to speak out for the rights of others,
rather than securing one’s own position of power. This “preferential
option” for the rights of others, which in reality is a responsibility, renders
the call for exemptions regarding the service to others—be it health
services, commerce, or anything else—utterly self-centered and
defensive. It turns religious freedom into a privilege that must be
defended against moral strangers or moral enemies whose capability to
act morally is denied. If religious freedom is rescued both from such a
self-centered reading and from its narrow legal interpretation, its ethical
dimension, contrary to being a privilege, appears in plain sight: it is the
moral freedom that will respond to those whose needs, desires, and rights
remain otherwise unanswered, and the moral freedom to respect others in
their vulnerability and agency, too.
Because the public space is never unoccupied, Christians must choose
where they stand, and with whom they stand. The parables of the Gospels,
often alluding to the spatial terms of the “margin” and the “center,” help
to discern where to look and to whom to attend. Furthermore, as the most
“cosmopolitan” Apostle, Paul, writes in his letter to the Galatians,
Christian ethics is indeed an ethics of social integration, calling for the
peaceful cohabitation of different groups. 133 For Christians, ultimately,
identity is not what matters, nor should it matter: “There is neither Jew
nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you
are all one in Christ Jesus.”134 Rather than being an exclusive truth claim
131. See BENHABIB, supra note 37 (explaning how the public space is never truly empty).
132. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND
THE LAW (2009).
133. Galatians 3:26–29.
134. Id. at 3:28.
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of Christianity, this is a radically inclusive statement, not only claiming
the freedom of Christians but their liberation from the concern with social
status, gender, ethnicity, or even their religion. Here, I would argue, a
whole new story of religious freedom was meant to begin, liberating the
oneness in Jesus Christ to the oneness of the one human family.

